Is Boys’ Underachievement Caused by Too Much Feminization in Education?

Feminization in education refers to the increasing dominance of females within the teaching profession, especially in early childhood education and primary education, and its consequences.  Various arguments are being given on why this is generally a bad thing. The first argument is that it deprives boys and girls from male role models.  In South Africa, with a sizable share of one-parent and zero-parent households, this could have a significant effect.  Secondly, when teachers are increasingly recruited from only half of the population, there is a higher chance on qualified teacher shortages.

The third argument is potentially the strongest, that increasing feminisation has negative effects on learning outcomes of boys.  PISA results have consistently shown that boys are more likely than girls to be overall low-achievers, meaning that they are more likely than girls to perform below the baseline level of proficiency in all three of the subjects that are tested in PISA: reading, mathematics and science.  Moreover, boys in OECD countries are twice as likely as girls to report that school is a waste of time, and are 5 percentage points more likely than girls to agree or strongly agree that school has done little to prepare them for adult life when they leave school.

This underachievement and these negative attitudes seem to be strongly related to how girls and boys absorb society’s notions of “masculine” and “feminine” behaviour and pursuits as they grow up. For example, several research studies suggest that, for many boys, it is not acceptable to be seen to be interested in school work. Boys adopt a concept of masculinity that includes a disregard for authority, academic work and formal achievement. For these boys, academic achievement is not “cool” (Salisbury et al., 1999). Although an individual boy may understand how important it is to study and achieve at school, he will choose to do neither for fear of being excluded from the society of his male classmates. Indeed, some studies have suggested that boys’ motivation at school dissipates from the age of eight onwards and that by the age of 10 or 11, 40% of boys belong to one of three groups: the “disaffected”, the “disappointed” and the “disappeared”. Members of the latter group either drop out of the education system or are thrown out. Meanwhile, studies show that girls seem to “allow” their female peers to work hard at school, as long as they are also perceived as “cool” outside of school. Other studies suggest that girls get greater intrinsic satisfaction from doing well at school than boys do.  Boys are more likely than girls, on average, to be disruptive, test boundaries and be physically active – in other words, to have less self-regulation. As boys and girls mature, gender differences grow even wider as boys start withdrawing in class and becoming disengaged.

These findings seem to suggest that traditional school settings are more challenging for boys than for girls.  Current school environments may inadvertently disadvantage boys with its emphasis on coursework and downplaying of competition. A lack of male teachers may increase the impression among boys that schools are something ‘for girls’. Secondly, male teachers may be more sensitive to and able to deal with these challenges.

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Why Are Beliefs About Education Hard to Change?

gearThe beliefs that teachers and school leaders hold about education are arguably instrumental to their practice. These include beliefs about the purpose of education, beliefs about how people learn, beliefs about the nature of their subject (e.g. math wars) and beliefs about learners (debate to what extent learning outcomes are genetically determined: nature vs nurture debate).  In our activities, we often rush to strengthen educators’ knowledge and skills.  But shouldn’t we focus more on changing their beliefs? One reason is that changing our beliefs is hard and difficult to measure.

Why are beliefs so hard to change? Psychology might provide us with some answers.

According to Kahneman, we are prone to overconfidence. When making judgements, we rely on information that comes to mind, neglect what we don’t know and construct a coherent story in which our judgement makes sense.  90% of car drivers think they are better than average.  I don’t know of any similar research for teachers, but I’m pretty sure more than 50% thinks that they’re better than average.  Add to this the fact that uncertainty is not socially acceptable for a “professional”.

Secondly, we tend to surround ourselves with people who confirm our beliefs, gradually locking ourselves into ‘echo chambers’.  According to Yochai Benkler in his book “The Wealth of Networks”, individuals with shared interests are far more likely to find each other or converge around a source of information online than offline. Social media enable members of such groups to strengthen each other’s beliefs, by shutting out contradictory information and to take collective action.  Even people with fringe beliefs are likely to find like-minded souls online and see their views reinforced. In these ways can establish themselves and persist long after outsiders deem them debunked: see, for example, online communities devoted to the idea that the government is spraying “chemtrails” from high-flying aircraft or that evidence suggesting that vaccines cause autism is being suppressed.

Technology companies play an active role in constructing such echo chambers. In 2011, Eli Pariser, an internet activist, warned for a “filter bubble”. He worried that Google’s search algorithms, which offer users personalised results according to what the system knows of their preferences and surfing behaviour, would prevent people from accessing countervailing views. Facebook subsequently became a much better—or worse—example. Its algorithms are designed to populate people’s news feeds with content similar to material they previously “liked”.

Another explanation may lie in a general a loss of trust in institutions and distrust of experts.  The Economist recently ran a briefing on the emerging post-truth politics, in which the value of evidence seems to diminish in favour of so-called “authentic” politicians, who “tell it how it is” (ie, say what people feel). Teachers may trust their own experience more than published research, for example on learning styles, ability grouping or using grades.  One reason for this within the education field is that education experts often contradict each other,also because of the difficulty to generalise many findings across contexts and cultures.

Education is one of those domains on which everyone holds an opinion.  For most people, these opinions are based on their own experience and intuition about “what feels right” or “what ought to be true”.  Many feel that teaching boils down to common sense.  These opinions attract a lot of attention. An example is the regular stream of opinion articles lamenting the ‘crisis in education’, the fact that ‘education has not evolved for 100 years’ and that ‘it doesn’t equip our children with 21st century skills.’  Moreover, education seems to be particularly prone to ‘fads’ (one computer or tablet per learner, standardised testing, small class sizes), which often come from the burning desire to ‘fix education. Coming up with a ‘magic bullet’ is easier than changing the oil tanker that an education system is.

Context plays a role as well.  Research in Singapore showed that teachers pointed to contextual constraints to account for the inconsistency between their espoused beliefs and the teacher-centric teaching practice. Teachers may feel the pressure to cover the curriculum and get learners ready for examinations.  Parents may resist relatively new approaches like inclusivity and heterogeneous grouping and threaten to move their children to another school. Ongoing research in Free State, South Africa, shows no relation between teachers’ preference for a surface versus deep learning focus of teaching and learning outcomes, likely as a result of contextual factors. There might be, in other words, be a gap between the ideal world of educational research and real world of cash-strapped education systems.

Should professional development of teachers and school leaders focus on changing those beliefs?

The main argument to focus on beliefs is that sustainable changes in teaching practice are only likely to occur when teachers support the underlying rationale.  However, beliefs are not static. People do change their beliefs. But often gradually, not as a result of one workshop. Good insight in recognising and dealing with resistance, ways how change occurs, effective feedback and adoption of innovations should be important elements in the repertoire of every education advisor.

Mike Hulme’s book on climate change provides some useful recipes from complexity science:

Rather than aiming to find one global solution, a variety of approaches catering to different world views, ideas about governance, science etc. stands a better chance at curbing climate change.  Climate change derives from various other problems, such as population growth, unsustainable energy, endemic poverty, food security, deforestation, biodiversity loss…  Rather than framing climate change as a mega-problem, requiring a mega-solution, Hulme argues that disentangling the issue, moving climate change to the background, is more likely to yield effect.

Using a variety of strategies (testimonies, research findings, inspiring stories of change) for a variety of beliefs and sensitivities for changing them.  Research indicates that the perspectives of administrators and teachers can differ significantly on this point. Administrators tend to perceive nationally normed standardised assessments, whereas teachers grant more validity to classroom observations (Guskey, 2007).

In a trajectory that aims at changing teachers’ beliefs, a possible succession of steps is:

  • Making existing beliefs explicit
  • Creating conditions in which existing beliefs can be questioned
  • Presenting the conflict between their old and new beliefs as challenging rather than threatening
  • Providing teachers with the necessary time to reflect on their beliefs, reconcile the new beliefs with their existing knowledge framework and teaching context.

Another point of attention is that we should take care to back up what we introduce in training activities with decent research findings and theoretical underpinnings, and discuss these and their implications with educators.  In doing this, we must help educators understand how to cope with the complexities of classroom life and how to apply theory and new findings in real classrooms where the relationship between theory and practice is complex and where numerous constraints and pressures influence teacher thinking.

The Role of Gender in Fighting Poverty

gender-saSouth Africa has made great strides towards achieving gender equality in education. According to the 2015 Millennium Development Goals (MDG) report, gender parity on all education indicators has been achieved. In terms of access to primary education, gender gaps on educational accessibility are closed.  Proportionally more females are enrolled in secondary and tertiary level education than males.  Females are also more likely to have higher levels of educational attainment than males.

This progress towards gender equality has contributed to poverty reduction in various ways:

  • Increased levels of education have empowered females as they get equipped with the self-confidence, knowledge and skills to participate fully in their communities.
  • Education of girls has resulted in higher family incomes and increased productivity.
  • Health benefits of education with an impact on poverty reduction include delayed marriages, reduced fertility rates and improved maternal and child health.

Despite the achievements, the latest Gender Series report on Education (2004-2014) from Statistics SA reveals many remaining challenges:

  1. There are large gaps in subject preferences and performance, which often result in varying social and economic gender inequalities. For example, there is a significant gap in South Africa in favour of males qualified in Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) subjects, resulting in male dominance in STEM-related occupations such as engineers and architects.  More females are enrolled for Business and Commerce, Education and Other Humanities study fields. Education has the highest gender disparities, followed by Other Humanities (3/1 and 1,77/1 ratios respectively).  Male-dominated professions are often those that command higher pay.  Gender prejudice within the education system about maths and science abilities of females remain widespread.
  2. Males are more likely than females to enrol in Masters and Doctorate studies.  Females enrol more frequently in lower tertiary qualifications.
  3. Employment absorption rates for females are significantly lower than for males, leaving them more at risk of poverty despite their education levels.  Moreover, South African women remain disadvantaged in terms of pay, promotion, job stability and status.
  4. There are persistent gender inequalities in performing unpaid care or house work.  Women spend more time on unpaid work, having a negative impact on their careers in the labour market, impacting their work status and pay, regardless of levels of education obtained.
  5. Boys’ performance in literacy is significantly lower than that of girls. Boys are also more likely to leave school early. Some of the negative social impacts associated with boys dropping out of school include crime and gender-based violence. This confirms the need for a growing focus within the gender rights movement on the construction of masculinity.
  6. Girls are more likely to stay at home due to family commitments such as child minding, which seems to have a bigger impact on girls living in urban areas as opposed to rural areas. Pregnancy and marriage also act as social gender-specific obstacles that hinder access to education for girls, particularly those from rural areas.

The most fundamental impact of education and gender equality on poverty reduction may lie in its impact on slowly changing norms in a society:

“In particular, the education of boys and girls—beyond its role in building human capital—is crucial in shaping norms. In multiple discussions, adolescent boys and girls described how education exposed them to new ideas and knowledge, enlarging their capacity to analyse and encouraging critical scrutiny of established gender relations and the status quo. These discussions reaffirmed what is already known about the intergenerational transfer and reproduction of norms within households. Education fosters learning away from the household environment where gender roles are played out in every interaction and action. The research team realised the importance of ensuring that school curricula offer gender-neutral learning opportunities.”  (World Bank, 2012)

 

These results confirm some of the findings from the World Bank Report which I wrote about earlier.

“One of the more consistent findings across the 97 research sites is the universality and resilience of the norms that underpin gender roles.  In every research location, women and men of all generations identified the dominance of women’s domestic role and men’s bread winning role as absolutely core to female and male identities. Some of the focus groups gave evidence of gender norms changing, albeit slowly and incrementally, with new economic opportunity, markets, and urbanization.”

This blog post is a contribution to the IIEP Course “Monitoring and Evaluating Gender Equality in Education’, edition 2016.

Sources:

Taylor, S. & Spaull, N. 2015. Measuring access to learning over a period of increased access to schooling: The case of Southern and Eastern Africa since 2000, International Journal of Educational Development, 41, 47-59.

Statistics SA, 2015, Gender Series Volume II, Education, Report No. 03-10-12 (2004–2014)

World Bank, 2012, On Norms and Agency Conversations about Gender Equality with Women and Men in 20 Countries (link)

 

Who Owns the Future? (Jaron Lanier)

lanierWith Who Owns the Future, Jaron Lanier has delivered another wildly thought-provoking work of “speculative advocacy” after his 2010 work “You Are Not a Gadget”.

Lanier is a kind of technology wizard-sociologist. The New York Times described him as the father of virtual reality in the gaudy, reputation-burnishing way that Michael Jackson was the king of pop.

The book problematises our relation with the online environment, which has evolved from a largely open web to a much more closed one.  The early Web was characterised by people designing their own websites, registering their own domains, creatively building their unique online space. The closed Web is dominated by a few ‘Siren Servers’, technology behemoths that have come to dominate how we interact with the Web.  Driven by an one-sided notion of ‘openness’, people are encouraged to ‘share’ everything for free and be open about one’s personal information.  However, these companies are secretive about the algorithms they use to lure advertisers and decide what appears in front of you. “You don’t get to know what correlations have been calculated about you by Google, Facebook, an insurance company or a financial entity and that’s the kind of data that influences your life in a networked world.” (p.202)

“We want free online experiences so badly that we are happy to not be paid for information that comes from us now or ever. That sensibility also implies that the more dominant information becomes in our economy, the less most of us will be worth.”

Why should we care if people equal the Web with Facebook and search with Google? Lanier presents some far-reaching economic and political consequences.

Internet companies have succeeded in making people believe that data should be freely given to them.  The early internet years have fetishized open access and knowledge-sharing in a way that has distracted people from demanding fairness and job security in an information economy. Through the spread of smartphones and increasingly, the internet of things, we increasingly leave a constant data trail that is eagerly hoovered up by companies to improve their algorithms who make these same people economically redundant.

These aggregate data are clearly very lucrative, given these companies’ market values Networks create network effects, as every additional user renders the network more powerful (Metcalfe’s Law).  These network effects tend to lead to monopolies (or oligopolies) wielding enormous power and preventing newcomers from entering the market.  This threatens the diversity capitalism needs. Lanier lays out how evolutions in Artificial Intelligence, genetics and Virtual Reality, combined with Moore’s Law, are strengthening this tendency.

A second impact lies in the ‘demonetisation’ of more and more sectors of the economy.  Lanier describes how the advantage of local knowledge is gradually reduced by mining large datasets.  Instead of local knowledge about a place, an algorithm identifies which places you are likely to want to visit on your city trip.  GPS and Uber have replaced the value of local knowledge of a city to get around.  These shifts have two important consequences for markets:

  • Markets shrink as the total value that is created in sectors decreases;
  • Proportionally more people lose income as the distribution of earnings in more sectors turns from a bell-shaped curve, where the largest share goes to the middle class, to a right-skewed distribution where the bulk of earnings is concentrated among a small group of people (winner-takes-all markets).

The xMOOC rationale that aims at replacing face-to-face lectures by the lecture videos of the ‘best lecturers in the world’ fits in this story. Data mining and ‘smart’ algorithms that tailor explanations and exercises to students’ interests and progress may not necessarily be better than current education systems, but are likely to be cheaper and benefit a few companies like Coursera. With every posting on the forum, every video you watch, every quiz you take, the system becomes ‘smarter’, gradually reducing the economic value of most people who take part in these courses.  Similar trends are taking shape in lots of middle class professions such as accounting, medicine and transport.

The resulting political consequences are similarly profound. Democracies can only function in societies with a large middle class.  Large inequalities in a society increase the risk that either the elite financially captures the state or that the mass will vote populists into office with self-destructing policies.

Lanier does not offer easy ways out.  Banning technological process tends to be futile. Nor is Lanier a ‘leftie’, advocating large scale redistribution. He pleads for a ‘humanistic digital economy’ where technology is in function of society and in which the continued existence of a thriving middle class is supported.  In such an economy, information is valued fairly and transactions occur transparently. People would receive small payments (nanopayments) every time their information is used. They would also pay to use information, like using a search engine or creating a social media profile.  However, they would be paid a small but fair amount if their data are used by companies such as Google or Facebook to improve their algorithms. In such an economy we would, throughout our lives, be financially rewarded by an accumulation of small remunerations.

“By making opportunity more incremental, open and diverse than it was in the Sirenic era, most people ought to find some way to build up material dignity in the course of their lives.  The alternative would have been feeding data into Siren Servers, which lock people in by goading them into free-will-leeching feedback loops so that they become better represented by algorithms.” (p.347)

A re-design of the internet from a one-way network to a two-way network would make this possible.   In a one-way network you can create a link to a website or copy a file, but the original author will not know that you created a link or made a copy unless you inform the author.  Lanier’s concept of provenance – the recording of where value originates – is fundamental to such an ethical information economy.  In a two-way network information flows in both directions. In such a system, illegal copying is no longer possible.  Lanier compares it with systems like the Apple store or the Amazon e-book store, where you don’t buy actually copies of apps or books, but only the right to use or read it. People could protect their privacy by making the cost to use their personal data prohibitive.

The solution Lanier advocates is optimistic and might be utopian. It is also deeply realistic though in its acceptance that people are unlikely to forgo their desire for ‘free’ services anytime soon. Technology companies have become a ‘third force’, next to the state and religion. This book may not provide many answers (“It is too early for me to solve every problem brought up by the approach I’m advocating here”), but it does articulate a desperate need for them.

The Euro Crisis and its Aftermath (Jean Pisani-Ferry)

$_35Until 2013, Pisani-Ferry was the director of Bruegel, a think-tank.  In his book Jean Pisani-Ferry recalls the story of the euro from “the day it ceased being boring” and explores the underlying causes of the euro crisis.

The introduction of the euro was intended to create a forefront for more political and economic harmonisation among the adopting countries.  However, in the mid-2000s, it became gradually clear that national economies were diverging rather than converging.  Northern European economies like Germany were doing penance, running surpluses and accumulating savings, while countries in Southern Europe (incl. Ireland) went through a period of euphoria and saw consumption and debt rising.

After the introduction of the euro, these countries experienced a ‘golden decade’. They experienced a strong drop in interest rates, which reduced their debt burden and opened credit floodgates.  Resulting increases in wages and prices created higher inflation than in the northern countries.  Interest rates were the same across the Eurozone, but prices of nontradable goods and services such as houses and restaurant meals were not.  As a result, inflation rates were also not the same and the real cost of credit (the difference between the interest and the inflation rates) was much lower in the southern countries and Ireland.  In Spain, poor households bought houses they could hardly afford, helped by the now infamous cajas, the regional savings banks, creating their own version of the subprime crisis.

Then, on 16 October 2009 the euro stopped being boring.  That day, Greek prime minster George Papandreou confessed that Greek debt and deficit numbers were much worse than reported.  Investors suddenly realised that Greek debt was more risky than German debt and the spread between the two rose to 4%.  Greece revealed the incompleteness of the European construction and the strong disagreements about how to complete its architecture.

The negative feedback loop between banks and their sovereigns (countries) became apparent, the so-called ‘doom loop’.  Why is this relation problematic? Banks usually have large portfolios of debt issued by their countries.  At the same time, they depend on their sovereign for assistance in case things turn sour.  When investors doubt a country’s guarantee to save its banks, these banks can see their capital flows come to a sudden stop.

An example. The Spanish state was borrowing from the Spanish commercial banks which, in turn, borrowed from the Spanish central bank, which, in turn, borrowed from the ECB.  Meanwhile, private money flowing out from Spain was being deposited with German (or other northern European) banks, which, in turn, deposited it with the Bundesbank, which in turn lent it to the ECB.  The European system of central banks had become a sort of gigantic artificial heart that pumped back into southern Europe money flowing out from it in search of northern safety (p.145).

“Banks may be European (or global) in life, but they remain national in death.”

This explains why Ireland, with a debt-to-GDP ratio of only 25% got into problems. Its banking system was 8 times the size of its GDP.  Similarly, Spain’s problem was not a fiscal one, having low debt and running current account surpluses.  Its problem was that Spanish banks accumulated lots of loans that became non-performing when real estate prices plunged.  Add to this that the housing boom in Spain created a very unbalanced economy in which the non-tradable sector had expanded beyond reason at the cost of the tradable-goods sector.

Overall, debt levels and deficits in the Eurozone are much lower than those in the US or Japan.  What makes Eurozone debt vulnerable (less internal debt), faces a grim long-term demographic outlook (low fertility rates and not enough migration) and faces a lack of competitiveness (in the south).

Pisani-Ferry describes how Eurozone leaders throughout the crisis devised piecemeal solutions that were time and time again overtaken by reality.

The introduction of a common currency removed external devaluations as a way to inflate away debt and restore competitiveness as a tool from the toolbox. Milton Friedman compared devaluating a currency with daylight saving time.  It’s much easier to change time than to ask everyone to change their habits. In the same way, when a currency is overvalued, it is easier to devalue the exchange rate than to modify all wages and prices individually. By entering the Eurozone, member countries gave up this popular weapon, leaving them only the painful option of internal devaluation.

Much has been achieved since the outbreak of the euro crisis.  Under massive market pressure and by overcoming deep divisions, countries have agreed on new rules and created new institutions.  These solutions increased the power of the European institutions.  For example, the Commission received an ex-ante near-veto on national budget plans, including automatic sanctions for sinners. However, as economic prospects have improved, the political sentiment has clearly deteriorated.  Politics lag behind economics, which in turn, lag behind market developments.

On the other hand, solutions so far have only been found under the pressure of urgency and in an attempt to avoid the worst.  In Pisani-Ferry’s words, Europe has consistently displayed a strong sense of survival, but it has equally consistently failed to display a sense of common purpose (p.175).  The sense of survival comes from a realisation that a unified Europe is the only chance for Europe’s nations to remain significant actors in the world economy and to contribute to the shaping of global rules. The main challenge of European policy makers is to chart the road to continued relevance and to convince European citizens that it is the right road to take.

So far, solutions for the Eurozone crisis (financial firewall, fiscal treaty, building blocks of banking union) have much of an adhocracy.  Decisions on policy moves were not taken on the ground whether they would improve outcomes, but whether they were needed to avert disaster, like house owners only contemplating repairs when the house is about to collapse.

For Pisani-Ferry, a sustainable solution to deal with all the following aspects:

  1. The ECB’s inflation mandate of an average inflation rate across the Eurozone close to 2% implies a higher inflation rate in Northern Europe for several years.  During the first 12 years of the Euro, inflation rates were higher in Southern Europe.  The correction process has started for wages, but prices lag behind in the South because of the high cost of credit and the fact that many sectors are not open to competition.  A side effect of low interest rates is that non-functioning firms still get access to cheap credit, preventing the process of creative destruction, which would reduce supply, allowing others to raise prices, resulting in inflation.
  2. The EU’s budget comprises 1% of its total GDP and negotiated (and fixed) for periods of 7 years. This leaves little room for flexibility.
  3. For the dollar, US Treasuries are the safe assets.  For the Eurozone, 10-year German government bonds (‘Bunds’) are the de facto safe assets. This is an advantage (‘rent’) for Germany, as it can borrow money at lower rates than other countries. Because of this privilege, Germany should take up special responsibilities such as acting as an insurer for the whole Eurozone or sharing this rent with other countries through issuing Eurobonds.
  4. Gradual acknowledgement of reality of unsustainability of Greek debt, acceptance of debt restructuring and design of systematic way of dealing with debt crises.
  5. Acceptance of ECB as a lender of last resort.
  6. Strengthen the democratic character of the EU.  Germans, for example, are particularly underrepresented in the parliament in comparison to citizens from smaller countries.
  7. Governance reform.  The most important one.

“The euro area is not equipped with a government, but with a series of partial powers.  The ECB has decision-making capacity in its important, but limited domain (it makes full use of it).  The Commission has been given a defined mandate of oversight of national policies (it generally fulfils it) and a broader mission to chart a way through the policy challenges (it sometimes fulfil it and sometimes forgets it). Berlin exercises leadership (or not).  Paris tries to balance it (effectually or not).  Bratislava or Helsinki insists on specific points that are close to their hearts (and generally push through a minor concession).  Rome matters when the prime minister has stature (not always the case).  And the president of the Eurogroup chairs the meetings of finance ministers (and does little more).  Europe’s governance is reminiscent of Blaise Pascal’s definition of the universe: a sphere, the centre of which is everywhere…” But unlike Pascal’s universe, few observers, if any, see the hand of God in its design” (pp.165-166)

Currency unification has led European states to an unknown territory in which national borders are less defined as they used to be.  The euro has created a community of fate.  The EU and the Euro zone need a common vision on their future.

Basically, there are two models for the Eurozone:

  • An agglomeration model that accepts concentration of activities in certain areas, for example manufacturing in northern Europe.  This model comes with mobility of labour, portable social rights, acceptance of national current account deficits and surpluses and a full banking union.
  • A rebalancing model that focuses on limiting differences among countries.  This comes with attempts to southern re-industrialisation. This is the logic of the Structural Funds.

The agglomeration model is economically more efficient.  Not every country is good at everything and the agglomeration model stimulates countries to specialise.  However, this model is likely to lead to wider (but not necessarily permanent) disparities in GDP/person and would require euro-area-wide taxation and transfer systems. Also, the agglomeration model requires a stronger political community, something which still needs to materialize, if it ever will.

A permanent solution for the Eurozone’s travails would need to answer fundamental questions about the union:

  1. Are countries and their citizens prepared to embrace a degree of labour, product and capital market integration that is needed for a monetary union to function?  Current discussions about the scaling back the Schengen union and the rise of extreme right suggest not.
  2. Are countries and their citizens ready for a fundamental redefinition of the fiscal framework that would create a predictable regime for state insolvency and introduce a degree of risk-sharing through the partial mutualisation of sovereign liabilities?
  3. Is the euro area willing to accept a degree of contingent redistribution across countries or even individuals in order to help smooth adjustment within a monetary union, for example through a common budget or through contingent transfer mechanisms?
  4. Is the euro area for institutional reform that would equip it with effective decision-making capacities (and budget) within it fields of competence?

In a democracy, power should be limited, but not weak (Tommasso Padoa-Schioppa)

Pisani-Ferry’s book tremendously helps to put the Euro crisis into perspective.  It enables the reader to understand the causes and the responses. In my case, it helped to change my opinion that the crisis was not so much (only) a consequence of southern (mainly Greek) profligacy, but a result of economic imbalances resulting from an incomplete monetary and fiscal union.

Thinking, Fast and Slow: the marvels and flaws of intuitive thinking

Intelligent gossip at the water cooler.  That’s the ultimate goal for Daniel Kahneman, author of the widely praised Thinking, Fast and Slow and recipient of the Nobel Prize in Economics.  cover Thinking fast slowPeople are not rational, but rather not-quite-rational human beings, their behaviour driven by two inner “agents”:  system 1 and system 2.  System 1 acts automatically and quickly, works with little or no effort and without any sense of voluntary control.  Unfortunately, it isn’t particularly strong in logic and statistics.  System 2 corresponds with who we think we are.  It is responsible for our effortful mental activities and can override the intuitive conclusions from system 1.  People are prone to cognitive biases and faulty decision-making, because system 1 kicks in before the more rational and logical system 2 is engaged.

“Although System 2 believes itself to be where the action is, the automatic System 1 is the hero of this book.”

Most of the time, we rely on the mental shortcuts of our system 1.  It is inexhaustible, unlike the limited capacity of system 2.  Paying attention can actually be taken quite literally.  Ego Depletion not only occurs through mental effort, but also through emotional temptations.  Kahneman recalls  the Oreo Experiment where 4-year old children’s ability to resist the immediate temptation for one Oreo biscuit for a two Oreos after 10 minutes turned out to strongly predict later success in life.

In the book, Kahneman vividly describes a wide range of systematic errors in our judgements and choices.  Rather than rational beings, our judgements and choices are affected by a whole variety of biases and fallacies.  An important characteristic of our system 1 is basing decisions on information that we see or that is immediately available. “What you see, is all there is” (WYSIATI).  It explains availability bias, the tendency to overweigh personal experiences, dramatic events (plane crashes!) and things that attract media coverage.  WYSIATI explains priming and halo effects.  The halo effect is our tendency to give a disproportionately high weight to first impressions such as a handsome and confident speaker.  The effect of recent exposure to information on our judgement is the priming effect.  It explains how  volunteers walk more slowly down a corridor after seeing words related to old age, or fare better in general-knowledge tests after writing down the attributes of a typical professor.  Anchoring is a form of priming explains why it’s a bad idea to let the salesman set the starting price when bargaining.  Overconfidence is another manifestation of WYSIATI.   When we estimate a quantity, we rely on information that comes to mind, neglect what we don’t know and construct a coherent story in which our estimate makes sense.  90% of car drivers think they are better than average.  We also focus on what we want and can do, neglecting the plans and skills of others.  Add to this the fact that uncertainty is not socially acceptable for a “professional”.  Another way our lazy System 1 operates is through substitution.  It replaces a target question with a heuristic question.  “How happy are you in life?” becomes “What is my mood right now?”

kahneman2

Our system 1 is pretty bad in statistics, especially in calculating probabilities.  The Law of Small Numbers refers to our tendency to ignore that small samples are much more likely to generate extreme outcomes.  It explains our bias to pay more attention to content than its reliability (sample sizes are rarely mentioned).  Another example is base rate neglect (planning fallacy).  A good example is that people, when given a person’s character description that resembles a librarian, are likely to think that that person will be a librarian, rather than a teacher, without accounting for the fact that there are much more teachers than librarians.  Base rate neglect means that we often exaggerate intuitive impressions of diagnosticity, rather than sticking close to the base rate.  Another example is confuse the probably with the plausible.  Our associate machinery likes to construct plausible stories from past events, rather than admitting it was all just a coincidence.  Adding detail to a description makes it more plausible, but less probable.  Upon reading a description of a woman called Linda, subjects rated it more likely that Linda was a bank teller who is active in the feminist movement than that Linda was a bank teller.

I am particularly fond of this example [the Linda problem] because I know that the [conjoint] statement is least probable, yet a little homunculus in my head continues to jump up and down, shouting at me—“but she can’t just be a bank teller; read the description.” source

Stephen Jay Gould

Our unwillingness to deduce the particular from the general is only matched by our willingness to infer the general from the particular.  Whether it’s about helping people in need or stock picking, when confronted with statistics, people are very reluctant to accept them, claiming they are different.   Conversely, coherence bias makes that people are very quick to draw general conclusions from events that happen in their neighbourhood.  WYSIATI!

People who claim to rely on their intuition are using their System 1.  People who are powerful (or made believe that they’re powerful), knowledgeable novices, in a good mood and have had a few successes are more likely to rely on their intuition.  Intuition makes only sense in a predictable environment and where skills are learnable through prolonged practice and lots of feedback.  Chess is an example.  Stock picking is not a good example, as it’s a low validity environment.  When asked for his favourite formula by Edge, Kahneman chose:

Success = talent + luck

Great success = little more talent + a lot more luck

We tend to overestimate talent and underestimate the role of luck.  Regression to the mean explains why highly intelligent women will marry less intelligent men and why winners of the ‘Golden Ball’ are likely to perform worse the year after.  A great achievement or misfortune is due to luck more than anything else and is unlikely to be repeated the year after.  Nassim Taleb speaks about the illusion of validity, the tendency to create ‘stories’ that ‘make sense’.

Prospect theory (for which Kahneman was awarded the Nobel) shows how choices we make are based on utilities rather than expected values. We respond stronger to losses than to gains (most people twice as strong).  prospect theoryEndowment effects make that the coffee mug we get for free, becomes more valuable once we have it.  It shows how we overweight (or completely neglect) unlikely events (possibility effects) and how a small probability of no success reduces its utility value disproportionally.  We are risk averse for our gains and risk seeking for our losses.  This explains how we keep buying lottery tickets and how insurance companies make profits.  In stock trading, we tend to sell winners and keep losers.  Often, it’s better to cut your losses, rather than waiting and hoping for breaking-even.  The best way to deal with our fallacies in low validity environments is to rely on formulas, standardized factual questions and to avoid inventing ‘broken legs’ (exceptions to your rules).

If that’s not enough, our memory, upon we base our decisions, suffers from quirks such as duration neglect and peak-end rule.  These were strikingly illustrated in one of Kahneman’s more harrowing experiments. Two groups of patients were to undergo painful colonoscopies. The patients in Group A got the normal procedure. So did the patients in Group B, except a few extra minutes of mild discomfort were added after the end of the examination. Which group suffered more? Well, Group B endured all the pain that Group A did, and then some. But since the prolonging of Group B’s colonoscopies meant that the procedure ended less painfully, the patients in this group retrospectively minded it less.

As with colonoscopies, so is it with life. It is the remembering self that calls the shots, not the experiencing self. Our memory of our vacations is determined by the peak-end rule, not by how fun (or miserable) it actually was moment by moment.

“Odd as it may seem, I am my remembering self, and the experiencing self, who does my livinkahnemang, is like a stranger to me.”

Are we really so hopeless? We can’t turn off our system 1 and Kahneman acknowledges that he’s just as prone to its pitfalls as anyone else.   However, being aware of biases and fallacies helps to recognise situations where it’s a good idea to sit down and involve your system 2.  There are some useful techniques as well.  Before taking an important decision, it’s a good idea to organise a pre-mortem meeting, a thought experiment where participants imagine they are a year into the future and implemented the plan as presented.  However, the outcome was a disaster and participants write a brief history of that disaster.  Pre-mortems help to legitimise doubt and encourage even supporters of the decision to search for possible threats.

Findings of behavioural economics find their way into policy and our daily life.  Both the UK and the US have
a government unit dedicated to applying its principles into policy making.  It helps explaining why personal stories trump numbers in global development and why education should focus on educating learners to be disciplined thinkers with knowledge of decision-making skills and principles of probability, choice theory and statistics.

Everyone should read Thinking, Fast and Slow.  It’s an astonishingly rich book: lucid, profound, full of intellectual surprises and self-help value.

Computers in Schools: Why Governments Should Do Their Homework

Time and time again, governments and NGOs herald the purchase of ICT as a panacea for improving the quality of education. The recent plans of Gauteng in South Africa are a good example. This study from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) provides an useful summary of the research done on the impact of ICT in primary level classrooms.  Latin America and the IDB have been at the forefront om some high-profile “One Laptop per Child” projects such as the Plan Ceibal (Uruguay), Enlaces (Chile) and the OLPC Programme in Peru, on which I blogged before.

Some extracts:

The evidence so far is quite persuasive that programs that overlook teacher training and the development of software may yield low returns.

One promising avenue lies in the use of ICT to realise productivity gains in school management:

The collection, transmission, and analysis of data on enrollment, absenteeism, test scores, and infrastructure can help principals spot a problem in a given classroom, administrators spot an exemplary school, and policymakers track the performance of the educational system and the resources available. However, the gains in productivity seen in the business sector are rarely seen in the educational system, some have argued, because most education managers are not knowledgeable in the use of information management tools.

Studies that measured the impact of ICT, both of the access to computers and the use of computers, found more often than not no significant impact on learning outcomes – an overview is included in the report.  The authors note that it’s not sufficient for ICT investments to produce a positive impact, they should produce a positive impact compared to traditional instruction and, even better, to similar investments in other areas such as teacher training, smaller classes or libraries.

All other things being equal, the impact of ICT investments will be higher when the quality of teaching is low, as the potential for learning gains is higher. This underlines the risk of extrapolating findings from developed to developing country context.

Some recommendations from the report:

  • Given the high investments, the low number of decent impact studies is surprising.  The impact of ICT investments heavily depends on the context and on the implementation.  As such, results from impact studies cannot be generalized over different programmes.  Start on a limited scale and build impact evaluation into the programme design is important.
  • Important to keep the Total Cost of Operation (TOC) of ICT investment into account rather than the purchase price. This includes maintenance, training, connectivity and electricity costs.  Recurrent costs typically take up about 40-50% of the initial investment (in Latin America).  These are permanent costs, which imply savings elsewhere in the education system or an overall increase in expenditure. A large share of rural schools, high electricity and connectivity costs and high wages (as in South Africa) thus increase the share of recurrent costs.
  • Most successful ICT project implementation focus on honing ICT skills of learners and pursuing Computer-Aided Instruction (CAI), for example for maths.